—Professor M. A. Barnik

1. Introduction:

Bangladesh’s politics once again stands at a crossroads. Although the July 2024 mass uprising ended Sheikh Hasina’s long fascist rule, the post-revolutionary dream is now collapsing under a legitimacy crisis. Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus, as the head of the interim government, had taken responsibility with the promise of establishing the demands written in the blood of the people’s movement. But more than a year has passed, and he has failed to establish either his own legitimacy or that of the movement.

2. Departure from the July Charter:

After the July uprising, the people’s expectations were—

Implementation of the July Charter,

Legitimacy through a referendum,

Formation of a Constituent Assembly,

Drafting of a new constitution.

Instead of pursuing these, Yunus—acting only on the advice of BNP’s Acting Chairman Tareq Rahman—announced elections for February 2026. This clearly revealed the allegation of deviating from the core objectives of the post-uprising movement.

3. Election or Power Transfer:

With the announcement of the election date, a question has arisen—will this election actually take place? Or will power transition occur earlier through some other arbitrary process?

History of the country suggests that elections have repeatedly failed to deliver political solutions.

In 1975, Sheikh Mujib’s power,

In 1982, Ershad’s rise,

In 2007, the army-backed government—

in all these cases, it was not elections, but irregular transfers of power that took place.

4. Spread of Instability and Violence:

Immediately after the election announcement, tension and violence have escalated.

First came the attack on VP Nur, which left him presumed dead.

Unrest continues to spread across universities.

Law and order has now deteriorated to a dire state.

In this situation, the public wonders—how much control does the interim government still have left?

5. Rumors of Emergency and Military Intervention:

The most discussed issue in political circles now is—will the President remain a silent spectator? Or will he intervene?

Rumors are circulating about the declaration of a state of emergency.

More far-sighted quarters fear that military rule may return again.

Though many dismiss this as mere rumor, in Bangladesh’s political history, rumors have often turned into reality.

6. International Comparisons:

The current situation in Bangladesh is not an isolated incident. Globally, there are several precedents of post-uprising governments failing.

Egypt (2011–2013): Despite elections following the mass movement, the interim government failed to resolve the legitimacy crisis, and eventually, military intervention occurred.

Sudan (2019): Even after the people’s movement brought regime change, elections were delayed, and the military reasserted influence.

Nepal (2006): Political stability came only after a new constitution and referendum, not merely from regime change.

These examples prove—without constitutional reform and legitimacy, post-uprising governments cannot survive.

7. Possible Future Scenarios:

From Bangladesh’s current trajectory, three possibilities may emerge:

(1) Temporary election: Even if Yunus’s declared February election is held, it will not resolve the legitimacy crisis.

(2) State of emergency: The President may declare emergency and suspend political activities.

(3) Military rule: The most alarming scenario—direct or indirect military influence in state power.

8. Conclusion:

By failing to establish his own legitimacy or that of the people’s movement for more than a year, Yunus has effectively prolonged the post-uprising vacuum. As a result, the center of power is now swirling outside elections, into other arbitrary sources. Therefore, the pressing question grows sharper—Is Bangladesh truly heading toward elections, or merely waiting for an arbitrary transition of power?