1. Introduction :

When the people advance like a torrent to break the monolithic, immovable state machinery, history has repeatedly shown that a mass uprising never follows the rigid embankments of an existing constitution. For a constitution usually protects the very regime against which the people have revolted. Thus, immediately after an uprising, the path nations typically follow includes forming a revolutionary government, drafting a proclamation, preparing a national charter, and finally framing a new constitution through a Constituent Assembly.

2. Recognition and Indemnity of the Revolution--- the inevitability of history :

When a revolution succeeds, the first tasks undertaken by a revolutionary government on behalf of the people are—

to declare the moral basis of the uprising,

to grant recognition to the revolutionaries,

to ensure full indemnity from all charges brought by the previous state against them,

and to define the direction of the new state order.

That is why, after many mass uprisings across the world, proclamations and national charters are drafted. On the basis of such a charter, a Constituent Assembly is formed, whose primary responsibility is:
“to draft a new constitution for rebuilding the country in the spirit of a just revolt.”

3. What happened in Bangladesh after the July uprising :

This is where the problems began.

(1) Instead of a revolutionary government, an ‘interim’ government was formed:

After a state revolution, a revolutionary government usually assumes responsibility as the representative of the people.
But after the July 2024 uprising, an Interim Government was formed—one that essentially maintained the continuity of the previous constitutional framework.

This created two major problems—
a. The revolution was not recognized as a ‘revolution’.
b. No structural framework was created for the indemnityু and security of the revolutionaries.

(2) The July Charter contains no clause acknowledging the justness of the revolution or granting indemnity:

A national charter is usually a moral and legal bridge—
it declares the fallen regime invalid and sets the outline for the future state order.

But the July Charter—

did not recognize the revolution,

did not grant indemnity to the revolutionaries,

did not specify any clear steps for drafting a new constitution.

Thus the charter remained an operational guideline, but did not become a proclamation of the revolution.

(3) The question of forming a Constituent Assembly remains shrouded in ambiguity:

The most important post-revolution task is to form a Constituent Assembly for drafting a new constitution.
But in the administrative structure after July—

there is no roadmap,

no timeline,

no national dialogue.

This has surrendered post-revolution political reconstruction to the uncertainties of the future.

(4) National election instead of referendum—revolutionary leadership at risk:

To establish the legal basis of the July Charter, a referendum was necessary. But instead of arranging that, the authorities directly moved toward a national election.

As a result—

the post-revolution government was not given direct approval by the people,

the charter did not receive constitutional legitimacy,

and even though a new government may emerge through elections, its foundation stands on ‘constitutional emptiness’.

The most dangerous aspect is—
the heroes of the revolution are now at risk of facing legal and political reprisals.
If the past continuity of power returns, the July uprising may easily be defined as an “illegal rebellion”.

(5) The interim government itself is also at risk:

After the election, the Chief Advisor and the members of the Advisory Council will step down—

without any legal basis for their own government,

without any constitutional protection,

without indemnity.

In other words, they themselves are in an uncertain position where they will have no protection except the goodwill of the future government.
This is, in essence, a voluntary walk into risk.

4. A nation misguided:

The July 2024 mass uprising was a moment of people’s triumph, but in the reconstruction of the post-uprising state—

the revolutionary continuity was not maintained,

the fundamental roadmap of state reconstruction was not implemented,

the dream of a new constitution remains unfulfilled,

and the heroes of the revolution remain in the shadow of uncertainty.

Political science teaches—
“If a revolution does not receive legal recognition, the revolutionaries themselves fall under the risk of criminalization.”

5. Bangladesh stands precisely at such a crossroads:

On one side, preparations for a new election,
on the other, the incompleteness of the revolutionary spirit—
the nation stands upon a path where wrong decisions may once again push the future into the abyss of uncertainty.